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Docencia
Economía de la Salud
Adverse Selection and Adverse Retention
Optimal health insurance contract: Is a deductible useful?
Cream-skimming, incentives for efficiency and payment system
Optimal non-linear health insurance
Third party purchasing of health services: Patient choice and agency
10 Incentive and selection effects in health insurance
Time-Consistent Health Insurance
A Good Sign for Multivariate Risk Taking
Multitasking and mixed systems for provider payment
Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy
Dynamic Inefficiencies in Insurance Markets: Evidence from long-term care insurance
Separating Selection and Incentive Effects: an Econometric Study of Swiss Health Insurance Claims Data
The Role of Commitment in dymanic contracts: Evidence from life insurance
Insurer-Provider Networks in the Medical Care Market
The Welfare E¤ects of Restricted Hospital Choice in the US Medical Care Market
Optimal risk adjustment in a model with adverse selection and spatial competition
A median voter model of health insurance with ex post moral hazard
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