Analyzing Reconciliation: A Structured Method for Measuring National Reconciliation Initiatives

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Reconciliation efforts have become an almost routine element of post-conflict peace building. From a scientific point of view, tools are needed to enable systematic studies of reconciliation. In this article, a structured method for studying national reconciliation initiatives is suggested, focusing on public statements and behaviors of those in power. The aim is to contribute to the development of systematic research in the field by designing a structured method to measure if, when, and what kind of reconciliation initiatives promote durable peace and if and when they instead might be an obstacle to peace building. Two widely used sources in peace and conflict research were used for coding: the Regional Survey of the World and the Africa Research Bulletin. The analytical framework, built on Galtung’s well-known conflict triangle and applied to Rwanda and Mozambique, proves to be useful for structuring the analysis of reconciliation at this level. In addition, three hypotheses on reconciliation are generated, which would benefit from further research.

During the last decade, literature on reconciliation as a conflict preventive measure has burgeoned. Reconciliation efforts in post-conflict transitional societies have also seen a large increase in recent years. After the ground-breaking work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, reconciliation—through truth commissions, official apologies, memorials, and so forth—has become an almost routine element of...
post-conflict peace-building rhetoric and practice. Peru, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Timor Leste, Liberia, and Rwanda, to name but a few, have recently embarked on processes of reconciliation.

One reason for the increased focus on reconciliation may be that nearly all conflicts today are intrastate. After peace, former enemies, perpetrators, and victims must continue living side-by-side just as before the atrocities were committed. However, attitudes and behaviors do not change from genocidal to collegial at the moment of a declaration of peace. Because coexistence is necessary, the need for reconciliation is profound.

Seen from an academic point of view, the notion of reconciliation has been anything but a conceptualized tool for peace building, or an operationalized term for post-conflict analysis. Few empirical studies have been made in the field of reconciliation. The gap between theory and practice is vast. Practitioners and academics alike make claims of the relation between, for example, truth, justice, peace, and reconciliation that are in need of empirical backing (Mendeloff, 2004; Weinstein & Stover, 2004). Research is needed to define the advantages, risks, and obstacles connected with reconciliation efforts in societies emerging from conflict.

In this article, I suggest a structured method for systematically studying reconciliation initiatives at a national level. The aim is to contribute to method development in the field of peace and reconciliation research. Considering the complexity of reconciliation, we must have a broad yet sharp array of methods for studying reconciliation processes at different levels. We need empirical research on the effects of these processes at the national, social, and individual levels to fully understand the promises and pitfalls of reconciliation. The focus at the individual level may, for example, be on trauma and how victims experience participating in a truth-telling process for reconciliation; at the social level, the focus may be on how former enemy groups perceive each other before, during, and after such a process; at the national level, the focus may be on how governments and rebel groups act for reconciliation.

Each level involves different methodological approaches. It is interesting to note that experimental study on the perceived fairness of truth
commissions has recently been conducted, indicating that new methodology within the field is emerging (Lillie & Janoff-Bulman, 2007).

The method proposed in this study contributes to the study of reconciliation at a national level, focusing on the public statements and behaviors of those in power. The national level is central for reconciliation as initiatives at this level have direct consequences for the population, and it is at this level the international community most often directs requests for reconciliation. The method proposed here is one building block in the search for a more comprehensive understanding of reconciliation.

The study of reconciliation at any level inevitably involves a simplification of reality, “[o]ne of the first and most difficult tasks of research in the social sciences” (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, p. 42). Reconciliation is an extremely complex process made up of particulars that will differ in every country, but the attempt must be—as in all social science research—“to go beyond these particulars to more general knowledge” and find “key features . . . from a mass of facts” (King et al., 1994, p. 42). Combined with studies at the individual and social levels, the method proposed here would eventually enable comparison of post-conflict societies working with reconciliation as a peace-building and conflict-preventive measure and enable researchers and practitioners to identify when reconciliation strategies help consolidate peace and if—and in that case when—there may be risks involved.

The method suggested in this article is applied to Rwanda and Mozambique, two countries with contrasting reconciliation processes, to see how well it reflects the difference in approach between the two countries. In addition, such an application may serve the function of generating new hypotheses that would be of interest for future research.

PREVIOUS RESEARCH

The Concept of Reconciliation

There has been little critical discussion in the literature regarding the term reconciliation, and the field tends to be indistinct and vague (for important

2To appreciate the complexity of reconciliation, we may also think of what must be undone; namely, the deep-rooted structures that bind groups together in war. Social psychological research gives us a deeper understanding of these processes. For important contributions in this field, see Beck (1999), Staub (2000), and Zukier (1994). I have previously written on this subject in Lundwall (2001). In a process of reconciliation, the attitudes, behaviors, and emotions developed during the war slowly begin to change in a “reconfiguring of identity . . . and [the] development of collaborative relationships that allow for difference” (Weinstein & Stover, 2004, p. 18).
exceptions, please see Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004; Hamber & van der Merwe, 1998). To address this problem of haziness and to delineate the topic, I have previously conducted a review of the field of reconciliation, summarizing the literature and studying practical examples of reconciliation projects in post-civil war societies (Brounéus, 2003). In this analysis, I found three common denominators in the various definitions of reconciliation:

- Reconciliation involves mutual acknowledgment of past suffering (between former enemies).
- Reconciliation involves the changing of destructive patterns of interaction between former enemies into constructive relationships, in attitudes, and behaviors.
- Reconciliation is a process toward sustainable peace.

Based on these common denominators, the following definition of reconciliation was formulated, which is the basis of this article:

Reconciliation is a societal process that involves mutual acknowledgment of past suffering and the changing of destructive attitudes and behaviors into constructive relationships toward sustainable peace.

Apart from distilling many definitions into one, the strength of this definition lies in its clear specification of the central components involved in reconciliation: changes in emotion (mutual acknowledgment of suffering), attitude, and behavior. It emphasizes that reconciliation is a societal process after armed conflict; that is, reconciliation involves changes within and between former enemy groups regarding themselves and the other. Finally, it is a process, not a remote goal to be achieved, when war has ended. This definition is in line with others that see reconciliation as a pragmatic process in which relationships are rebuilt to enable coexistence and sustainable peace (Bloomfield, 2006; Staub, 2006; van der Merwe, 1999).

Studies on Reconciliation

In 2003, Long and Brecke presented a study on “reconciliation events” and their impact on the durability of peace after intra- and interstate conflicts—the first and so far only systematic study of reconciliation at the national level. Long and Brecke defined a reconciliation event as including three factors: direct contact between senior representatives of the opposing parties, a public ceremony widely broadcast by national media, and symbolic behavior indicating peaceful relationships between former enemies. In their dataset over intrastate conflicts, Long and Brecke found that 11 cases (out of
430) included a reconciliation event according to their definition, of which 7 (64%) did not return to violent conflict thereafter. However, of the cases where no reconciliation event had taken place, 91% returned to the same conflict in the same time period (1957–2003). The authors found that reconciliation events, although scarce, were correlated with the end of conflict and with a return to social order after intrastate conflict. Long and Brecke explained the restoring effect of reconciliation events after civil war by developing a forgiveness model.

The study by Long and Brecke (2003) provided interesting suggestions about the role of reconciliation after intrastate conflict, such as the view that reconciliation is an emotionally driven, problem-solving behavior aimed at restoring relationships in society. However, some critical remarks can be made. For example, one analytically important issue concerns their operationalization of reconciliation. “Reconciliation events” are used as a proxy for reconciliation (p. 7). However, one possibility is that because peace is frail, reconciliation events will be frequent—but reconciliation may still be distant. More reconciliation events may thus actually be an indication of less reconciliation.

Furthermore, very few of the intrastate conflicts in the dataset of Long and Brecke (2003) had seen reconciliation events according to their definition (only 11 out of 430). The question arises whether this is due to the infrequency of reconciliation events or whether their definition does not capture reconciliation events. Both of these problems are addressed in the present study, the first by discriminating between reconciliation initiatives and reconciliation throughout the study, and the second by defining reconciliation initiatives in a more robust manner.

Also important for this study is the recent discussion in the literature regarding possible risks and potential dangers of reconciliation and other peace-promoting mechanisms. In one of the most cogent critiques of the field, Mendeloff (2004) argued that the beneficial claims made in the literature of truth-telling and truth-seeking mechanisms on reconciliation and peace have been based on flawed assumptions and on faith rather than on empirical evidence. He identified and evaluated eight common claims made regarding the peace- and reconciliation-promoting effects of truth telling and arrives at the conclusion that they are “either dubious or highly contested” (p. 375). He argued that there is a necessity to restrain the enthusiasm for these mechanisms in the absence of empirical knowledge and stressed the urgent need for systematic research in the area.

Similarly, Barsalou (2007) stated that identifying the strengths and risks with truth commissions is an area in crucial need of research, as they are widely used mechanisms in transitional countries after war. Recent empirical research has demonstrated that there may be risks of retraumatization
and insecurity for witnesses as a result of truth telling (Brounéus, 2008; Byrne, 2004). Stover (2004) found that many victims and witnesses in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) reported feelings of fear and abandonment on their return home after testifying. Likewise, witnesses in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) described being stigmatized, abandoned, and threatened by their community as a result of participating in the TRC (Backer, 2007). Security for the accused when returning to their home communities has been a major concern for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR; Justice H. B. Jallow, Prosecutor of the ICTR, personal communication, February 1, 2007). This emerging empirical knowledge suggests that security risks should be included in the truth, justice, and reconciliation equation.

Weinstein and Stover (2004) also emphasized the importance of empirical research on reconciliation and transitional justice mechanisms. Their edited volume on the aftermath of the atrocities in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia gave important empirical insights to the field. For example, regarding the ICTY (an important international reconciliation initiative), Corkalo et al. (2004) described how all national groups—Bosniak, Croat, and Serb—felt that their own national group was the greatest victim in the war and that the ICTY was prejudicial against their own group; similar findings have been found more recently in a study by Kostic (2007). Contrary to the common assumptions regarding truth telling, peace, and reconciliation, one of the conclusions of the Stover and Weinstein (2004) volume is that no direct link can be seen as yet between criminal trials and reconciliation; instead, they may cause further division and fear in former enemy groups. Likewise, Meernik (2005) found that arrests or judgments against war criminals in the ICTY were correlated with increased hostility between ethnic groups in Bosnia. Meernik’s conclusion was that the ICTY has not had a meaningful effect on societal peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

One of the few studies that has systematically tested the link between truth and reconciliation is Gibson’s (2004) South African survey. The results showed that among White South Africans, accepting the truth contributed to reconciliation. The same seemed to be true among Asian and colored South Africans. However, among Black South Africans, truth did not lead to reconciliation. Gibson pointed out that, although this may be a “disappointing finding . . . truth does not contribute to irreconciliation either” (p. 215)—a fear many had when gruesome testimonies were made.

The complexities of reconciliation processes are also readily discussed in International IDEA’s Reconciliation After Violent Conflict—A Handbook (Bloomfield, Barnes, & Huyse, 2003). For example, Huyse (2003) wrote
on the risks of justice in reconciliation processes, and Freeman and Hayner (2003) addressed the potential benefits and risks of truth telling. Another writer in the field, Ross (2004), stated that “[t]he evidence for or against reconciliation … is thin” (p. 215), and cautioned “that there may be significant costs to reconciliation events that might actually inhibit rather than advance peace processes” (p. 216). Several authors also pointed out that although many methods to enhance reconciliation have been proposed, we do not know if, when, or why they work (Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004; Kriesberg, 2004).

The questions raised by the study of Long and Brecke (2003) and the substantial critique of the field by Mendeloff (2004) and others makes clear that there is a lacuna to be filled in the research on reconciliation—that of bridging the theoretical and empirical divide. This article aims to contribute to the development of systematic research in the field by designing a method to measure reconciliation initiatives at a national level and generate hypotheses on reconciliation for theory building. Eventually, such a method would contribute to the systematic study of if, when, and what kind of reconciliation initiatives promote durable peace and if and when they instead might be an obstacle to peace building.

DECISIONS DELIMITING THE STUDY

To recapitulate, reconciliation is, according to the definition given earlier, a societal process that involves mutual acknowledgment of past suffering (emotion) and the changing of destructive attitudes and behavior into constructive relationships. Reconciliation may thus be seen as consisting of three parts: emotions, attitudes, and behaviors. In 1969, in the early days of peace and conflict research, Galtung suggested the well-known conflict triangle consisting of the three corners: (a) conflict attitudes; (b) conflict behavior; and (c) the conflict issue itself, the incompatibility.3 Reconciliation adheres to all three corners, requiring change in attitude; behavior and, concerning the incompatibility, a need for increasingly changing one’s emotional understanding of the past so that it also includes the

3Writing from a cross-disciplinary background of clinical psychology and peace and conflict research, Galtung’s (1969) classification lies in interesting parallel to the basic units of analysis in cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT): emotions, attitudes, and behaviors (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Persons & Davidson, 2001; Rachman, 1997). CBT is a goal-oriented form of psychotherapy for individuals and groups, and is based on empirical research and learning theory. These two frameworks have influenced my structuring of the analysis of reconciliation in this and earlier publications.
perspective of the other. In this article, the aim is to contribute to the study of reconciliation at a national level, where it is difficult to study emotions and affect but possible to observe the public statements and behaviors of those in power. Thus, the decision was made to focus on analyzing publicly demonstrated attitudes and behavior.

Reconciliation can be initiated at a grassroots, middle range, or top level (Brounéus, 2003); the top level consisting of national and international initiatives for reconciliation. The choice to concentrate on the national level in this study was made for the following reasons: (a) Reconciliation initiatives at this level have direct consequences for the population; (b) it is at this level the international community most often directs requests for reconciliation initiatives; and (c) sources are available for collecting systematic information at this level, which is crucial in this phase of method development.

METHOD

Operationalization

To analyze national attempts for reconciliation in post-conflict transitional settings, I suggest the term *national reconciliation initiatives*. A national reconciliation initiative is the formulation or demonstration of either an *attitude* or a *behavior* by national political leaders (be they government or opposition) that is consistent with reconciliation. To arrive at this operationalization of national reconciliation initiatives, South Africa was studied as a prototype for reconciliation work at a national level to design categories for investigation. The theoretical starting point of using Galtung’s (1969) conflict triangle seemed logical and compatible with the empirical reality that emerged from this initial phase of the study: categorizing reconciliation attitudes and behaviors proved possible. These attitudes and behaviors are identified by two indicators each: *normative statements* and *strategic policy statements* (measuring attitudes), and *symbolic acts* and *judicial acts* (measuring behavior); these are described in more detail later. Hence, all actions taken or statements made by the relevant actors in accordance with at least one of the four indicator categories are seen as national reconciliation initiatives (whether or not it is a genuine and sincere statement or action, and whether or not it actually produces reconciliation).

Sources

An initial overview of a wide variety of sources (non-governmental organization (NGO) materials, journals from different organizations, debate articles) made clear that strict guidelines would be needed for an effective and
consistent collection of material. Sources for coding were chosen in line with the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). The Regional Survey of the World (RSW) and the Africa Research Bulletin (ARB), two authoritative and widely used sources in peace and conflict research, offered a good overview of the situation (RSW) and more in-depth information (ARB). RSW, published by Routledge, is an important reference guide to developments on the African continent providing essays, statistics, and analyses written by leading experts on Africa. ARB, published by Blackwell, provides extensive reports on economic and political development throughout Africa, based on hundreds of reports from local press, Web sites and radio, as well as international organizations and news agencies.

Both sources claim to provide an impartial and comprehensive coverage of Africa. However, bias may always occur at different levels of reporting, depending, for example, on issues such as freedom of the press. Such risks must be taken into account when analyzing material from secondary and tertiary sources. For the purpose of method development and hypothesis generation, however, the importance of systematic and consistent reporting was of the essence. The ARB and RSW satisfactorily met these conditions and, therefore, are the sources we used to select statements and acts that would provide us with the material for our investigation and analysis.

Indicators

The coding system consists of two indicators measuring behavior (symbolic acts and judicial acts) and two for measuring attitude (normative statements and strategic policy statements). The definitions of the indicators can be seen in Tables 1 and 2.

The behavior category, consisting of symbolic acts and judicial acts, requires that concrete action be taken for reconciliation in the form, for example, of making an apology or establishing a truth commission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbolic acts</th>
<th>The actor does something more than he or she is expected or has to. A gesture indicating goodwill, openness, genuine motivation to break with the past (e.g., excuses, ceremonies, rituals, memorials, power sharing).</th>
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<tr>
<td>Judicial acts</td>
<td>The setting up of truth commissions, national trials for war criminals, arrests, indictments, judicial processes against persons in leading positions and instigators, investigations, specification of war crimes, writing dossiers, setting up commissions of inquiry to identify criminals.</td>
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Bar-Tal and Bennink (2004) emphasized the importance of acts of reconciliation to “create a new climate of relations . . .” and “. . . positive spirals of behavior” (p. 35), as has Hayner (1999). The attitude category, composed of normative statements and strategic policy statements, includes *political statements* that are made to convey a shift in attitude regarding structural reform vis-à-vis former enemies. For example, statements expressing opinions of an atmosphere of reconciliation or decisions made regarding strategies to enhance reconciliation are defined as reconciliation initiatives demonstrating an attitudinal shift (Table 2). This shift in attitude may or may not be genuine—this is not possible to determine by observation. Thus, it is important to keep in mind that what is measured here is the appearance of attitudinal shift and the appearance of a certain behavior, the genuine reasons behind statements or acts being impossible to capture. Furthermore, the act or statement *per se* does not have to include a direct reference to reconciliation—this categorization is made by the coding system. In

<table>
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<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>Discourse, ambience, perception of what kind of atmosphere should be present. Opinion is stated for reconciliation. A general picture of society is painted, a “generational vision” (Lederach, 1997).</th>
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<tr>
<td>Normative statements</td>
<td>Clear strategy that has been decided on, communication of decision or intention. Specific suggestions for reconciliatory change (e.g., a peace agreement, inviting to power sharing).</td>
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Two additional categories were also initially coded as indicators for *behavior* but were later excluded. To compare with the results of Long and Brecce (2003), I coded “proximity acts” as a behavior category. I defined proximity acts as “official well-publicized meetings between opponents/leaders in which a new type of relationship is initiated and in which a reconciliation-related topic is discussed,” thus including two of their three components of a reconciliation event. However, this indicator was only relevant for Mozambique (where it was coded 4 times in 12 years). In Rwanda, no particular proximity acts could be coded as the parties were constantly meeting in the Government of National Unity. Thus, such meetings may be more a structural measure of conflict ending (victory in Rwanda and compromise in Mozambique) than an indicator of a reconciliation initiative. This would support the notion mentioned earlier that Long and Brecce are not capturing reconciliation events in their codings. I also coded “restructuring acts” as a behavior category. By this I meant the “reorganization of social order and institutions, initiatives aimed at affecting many people. Something negative is withdrawn or changed, for example discriminatory laws, or alternatively, something positive is introduced, for example education of civil servants or the constellation of a new army.” However, this category can be seen as more directly linked to democratization than reconciliation and was thus excluded.
addition, the four indicators may unfortunately (but naturally) overlap or be simultaneous. In these instances, the reconciliation initiative will be coded in only one category. The decision of which category to choose is at times a balancing act, but often there will be slight preponderance of one particular indicator that subsequently is chosen. Let me present the indicators in more detail.

**Symbolic acts** indicate remorse to promote reconciliation and have been an increasingly frequent phenomenon over the last years. German Chancellor Willy Brandt was a pioneer, falling to his knees in the Old Jewish Ghetto in Warsaw in 1970, gesturing an apology for Germany’s atrocities during World War II. Other examples include the Irish Republican Army (IRA) apologizing for having killed civilians in its 30-year anti-British campaign, and the Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi in 2001 expressing remorse for the Korean suffering under Japanese rule during World War II. Official acknowledgment of, and expression of remorse for, past wrongs has a significant role in today’s world politics. This indicator relates to the third and last component in Long and Brecke’s (2003) definition of a “reconciliation event” but stands in my coding as a separate indicator.

**Judicial acts** are perhaps the most intuitive indicator for a reconciliation initiative. After the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the mid 1990s, truth commissions have become widely used in peace building after intrastate conflict (Hayner, 2001). This trend is in line with the debate that has developed in recent years regarding retributive versus restorative justice after civil war (Estrada-Hollenbeck, 2001; Mani, 2002; Minow, 1998; Stahn, 2001; Zehr, 2001). The question of how to deal with past atrocity in a country emerging from intrastate conflict is critical and enormously complex. A balance must be found between the necessity for tribunals to punish perpetrators (retributive justice) and the need for clarifying what happened in the past, which may include giving perpetrators amnesty to avoid disturbing a fragile peace (restorative justice). The indicator judicial act includes both forms of justice.

**Normative statements** are made to disclose an ambience, a perception of what kind of atmosphere should be present in society between former enemies for reconciliation, according to top-level political leaders. This category builds on John Paul Lederach’s (1997) argument about the “need to generate within the conflicted settings the space to envision a commonly shared future” for reconciliation and that such a long-term perspective requires a “generational vision” (p. 77). By making normative statements, a general picture of society is painted. It should be noted that no moral or ethical considerations are taken into account in the coding of normative statements.

**Strategic policy statements** demonstrate that a clear strategy has been decided on at the political level, which may promote reconciliation. The
suggestions for reconciliatory change should be specific and concrete, indicating a shift in attitude regarding how structural change may encourage coexistence between former rival groups. This indicator captures the first verbal formulations of what kind of structural change is needed for reconciliation. Together with symbolic acts, this indicator has the possibility to reflect whether such intentions are carried out—or whether they are merely cheap talk. This could be an interesting line to follow in future research. Examples of how the indicators were coded are given later.

APPLYING THE METHOD

Selection of Cases

Because the aim of this study is method development and hypothesis generation, two contrasting cases were chosen: Rwanda and Mozambique. Rwanda and Mozambique are dealing with reconciliation in what appears to be two very separate ways: In Rwanda, it is a state-driven process; in Mozambique, the state has been less central. Rwanda and Mozambique were also chosen in accordance with the UCDP’s list of countries engaged in intrastate armed conflict with an incompatibility regarding government; that is, regarding the type or composition of the political system (Harbom, 2007). Both countries were in a state of war in the beginning of the 1990s and have since then embarked on processes of reconciliation. The wars in each country were infamous for their cruelty. In Rwanda, from April to July 1994, an estimated 800,000 people were killed in one of the worst genocides of our time (Prunier, 1995). The genocide was the atrocious culmination of four years of war, which ended in July 1994 when the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) captured the capital and took control over the country. However, armed conflict at a lower level of intensity was to return in the years 1997 to 2002, discussed more later. (For important readings on Rwanda, see Dallaire, 2003; Melvern, 2000; Prunier, 1995.)

In Mozambique, a negotiated peace agreement was signed in 1992 that ended 16 years of civil war. The conflict between the Frelimo government (“Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique”) and the Renamo rebel forces (“Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana”) was characterized by extreme brutality, including mass killings and mutilations of civilians. Around 1 million Mozambicans were killed in the war; 1.5 million people fled to neighboring countries; and 3 million became internally displaced (Ohlson, 1998, p. 58). (Important readings on Mozambique include Honwana, 1998; Minter, 1994; Nordstrom, 1997; Vines, 1996.)

The presently ongoing reconciliation process in Rwanda was initiated by the government. Following decades of impunity for genocidal crimes, it
appeared crucial to the government to enforce justice and accountability for atrocities committed during the genocide. Accused perpetrators can be tried in one of three courts: the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha (established by the United Nation), the national courts, or the traditional courts, the gacaca, depending on the categorization of crime. Today, governmental billboards announce the importance of truth for reconciliation, and participation is mandatory in the meetings of the gacaca courts, which are being held in every village and neighborhood in the entire country.

In Mozambique, the official approach was instead to leave the past behind so that reconciliation would not be hindered (Hayner, 2001). Some actors argued that the question of accountability was too complex to be dealt with in trials, the war too horrible to be looked into (Hayner, 2001). However, from the signing of the accords, peace was solid and practical acts of reconciliation took place spontaneously at the grassroots level, such as ceremonies of healing and rehumanization. Traditional healers had a significant role. Simultaneously, at the political level, reconciliation was of little concern and had a less central role. Reconciliation rather meant to “forget the past and be tolerant” (senior leader of Renamo in Parliament, quoted in Hayner, 2001).

Coding

Rwanda and Mozambique were coded for national reconciliation initiatives by analyzing statements and developments that were recorded in the RSW and the ARB. Coding was first performed by a research assistant and thereafter recoded by me. The indicators were refined until interrater reliability was consistent. In both countries, the time period studied was 10 years: in Rwanda, from the end of the genocide and takeover by the RPF on July 18, 1994 through 2003; in Mozambique, from the peace agreement on October 4, 1992 (the Acordo Geral de Paz) through 2001. All documentation in the two sources on developments in Rwanda and Mozambique

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5Legislation was adopted in October, 2000 for the creation of the gacaca courts. In 2001, 260,000 gacaca judges were elected. The gacaca court system was officially launched on June 18, 2002. For more detailed information on the gacaca, see Honeyman et al., (2004) and Uvin (2003). I recently performed fieldwork at the individual and social level in Rwanda where issues not the focus in this article became paramount; for example, ethical issues of personal integrity and security for participants as well as political sensitivities and constraints (Brounéus, 2008). This illustrates the importance of using complementary methodological approaches for analyzing complex processes.

6For detailed coding rules, please contact me.
during this time period was copied word for word and sorted into the four indicator categories. The following are some examples.

**Symbolic acts.** “At the end of April 2000, Emmanuel Habyarimana, a Hutu and a senior army officer in the FAR (former Rwandan Armed Forces) was appointed as Defense Minister. Analysts in Kigali saw the appointment of a Hutu as head of the army as a positive gesture towards reconciliation” (ARB, 2000; May 13967).

The appointment of a former enemy as Defense Minister was coded as a symbolic act for reconciliation, as it is concrete reconciliatory action by the government symbolizing acceptance of a significant former enemy.

“On 7 April 1994, the two hardliners Mateus Ngonhamo (former Renamo guerilla commander) and Lagos Lidimo (former Frelimo) were inaugurated as the high command of the FADM (the Forcas Armadas de Defesa de Mocambique)” (RSW, p. 744).

Appointing two former enemies as the high command of the country’s armed forces demonstrates concrete action expressing reconciliation and is an important symbolic act by the government.

**Judicial acts.** “On 13 September 1995, a joint UN-Rwandan Commission of Inquiry was set up in order to identify RPF soldiers to be punished for having reacted in an excessive manner during fights with Hutu militias” (ARB, 1995; Sept. 11992).

Revenge killings and gross human rights violations by elements of the RPF toward the Hutu population were reported during and after the genocide. Linda Melvern (2000) referred to a United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) report that “found evidence of an unmistakable pattern of killing and persecution by the RPF” (p. 209), estimating that 30,000 Hutus were murdered by the RPF between July and September 1994. The government subsequently decided to seek justice for crimes such as those described earlier, which were committed by its own forces toward the former enemy. This act demonstrates an important judicial decision and was thus coded as a judicial act.

No examples of judicial acts were found in Mozambique.

**Normative statements.** “On 8 December 1994, General and Vice-President Paul Kagame said in London: ‘we reject any idea of amnesty for the sake national reconciliation. Bringing those responsible to justice is essential. I don’t understand what reconciliation would mean unless some of those responsible were brought to justice. Justice would help bring about reconciliation’” (ARB, 1994; Dec. 11693).
In this statement, former Vice President Kagame (the present president of Rwanda) portrays the government’s view of what is important for reconciliation. He is not communicating a decision of a clear strategy for reconciliation as yet (in which case it would be coded as a strategic policy statement) but rather expressing the government’s values on reconciliation (i.e., making a normative statement):

On 7 April 1994, after the swearing-in-ceremony as high command of FADM [previously mentioned], Ngonhamo (former Renamo) said that from this moment he ceased to be Renamo and that he now represented FADM, and Lidimo (former Frelimo) said the challenge facing them was to defend the territorial integrity of the whole country. (ARB, 1994; Apr. 11410)

These are important value shifts being expressed by two former enemies, now holding the joint position of high command, coded as normative statements.

Strategic Policy Statements

“On 8 December 1994, General and Vice-President Kagame said in London: the 2500 ex-FAR soldiers that had returned to Rwanda could be reintegrated into the new 40,000 strong army at a later stage” (ARB, 1994; Dec. 11694).

Here, Kagame delivers the government’s decision that ex-enemy soldiers can be reintegrated into the new national army, which is seen in this study as a strategy of structural change to encourage coexistence between former rival groups: a strategic policy statement.

“On 23 November 1993, during a CSC (Supervision and Control Commission, with representatives from Renamo and Frelimo) meeting, it was decided that both parties would start to confine their troops on 30 November” (ARB, 1994; Oct. 11612).

Again, this concerns a strategic decision at the political level, encouraging coexistence; thus, it is coded as a strategic policy statement.

RESULTS

In this section, I describe the frequency, type, and differences that emerged regarding national reconciliation initiatives in Rwanda and Mozambique. The aim of applying the method to these two contrasting countries was to see if expected differences concerning, for example, how formalized the reconciliation process is would be captured by using this methodology.
The results from the coding of national reconciliation initiatives during 10 years in Rwanda (1994–2003) and Mozambique (1992–2001) are presented in Table 3.

As can be seen, national reconciliation initiatives have been six times more frequent in Rwanda than in Mozambique. As mentioned earlier, no judicial acts were found at a national level in Mozambique. There has been no state-initiated truth commission or similar judicial proceeding for atrocities committed during the war (Hayner, 2001). The state has had a minor role in the reconciliation process. Instead, the process has been driven from a grassroots level and has focused more on the emotional aspects of reconciliation, which were outside the scope of this study. For example, rites of healing have frequently been used (Hayner, 2001; Nordstrom, 1997). To the extent Mozambique has taken national reconciliation initiatives, it has rather been as a shift in attitude than in behavior.

In Rwanda, strategic policy statements and symbolic acts have been the most prominent among the national reconciliation initiatives. Symbolic acts have maintained a quite constant level, except perhaps for a slight decrease during the conflict years of 1997 to 2002 (this period is discussed in the following section). Strategic policy statements were made most often in the first three years subsequent to the genocide and have later decreased. Similarly, normative statements (the second indicator measuring attitude) were most frequent in the two years directly following the genocide, 1994 and 1995. Judicial acts, on the other hand, are the only initiative that has increased somewhat over the 10-year period.

The results of the study suggest that Rwanda and Mozambique are indeed two countries involved in two very different processes of reconciliation. National reconciliation initiatives have been much more common in Rwanda than in Mozambique. The nation-wide reconciliation project in

### TABLE 3

Number of National Reconciliation Initiatives Over 10 Years per Indicator

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Behavior</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic acts</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial acts</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attitude</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative statements</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic policy statements</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>109</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Frequency of Initiatives**

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The results of the study suggest that Rwanda and Mozambique are indeed two countries involved in two very different processes of reconciliation. National reconciliation initiatives have been much more common in Rwanda than in Mozambique. The nation-wide reconciliation project in
Rwanda is thus a considerably more state-driven and formalized process than in Mozambique.

**Type of Initiative**

To the small extent national reconciliation initiatives were made in Mozambique, they were more often conveyed in attitudes (by making normative statements or strategic policy statements) than in behavior. In Rwanda, national reconciliation initiatives were conveyed in attitudes more often in the early years after the genocide and have subsequently decreased. Regarding the behavior category, the picture looks a bit different. Judicial acts increased slightly over the 10-year period. Symbolic acts decreased somewhat during the conflict years (1997–2002) but rose again in 2003 to the same levels as before 1997. Symbolic acts, such as making apologies or creating memorials, have been very common in Rwanda (38 in the 10-year period).

However, despite more national initiatives for reconciliation, Rwanda has seen more conflict than Mozambique in recent years. According to the UCDP data, Rwanda was caught up in minor conflicts (at least 25 battle related deaths per year) or war (at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year) each year from 1997 through 2002 (Harbom, 2007). During this period, 41 reconciliation initiatives were taken in Rwanda. No conflict activity has been reported for Mozambique since 1992 (Harbom, 2007).

Two types of initiatives dropped markedly in frequency in Rwanda during 1997 to 2002: normative statements and strategic policy statements. For example, normative statements were made 11 times during 1994 to 1996, whereas only 3 times in the years 1997 to 2002. Strategic policy statements were made at a frequency of 8 or 9 per year during 1994 to 1996, but only between 1 and 3 in the period 1997 to 2002. Although the numbers are too small to be tested statistically, the decrease in the attitude category of national reconciliation initiatives is notable. On the other hand, the behavior indicators decreased only slightly (symbolic acts: 15 in the years 1994–1996, 16 during 1997–2002) or increased (judicial acts: 4 in 1994–1996, 9 in 1997–2002). This increase in judicial acts may be due to the fact that arrests and trials gained momentum, and the gacaca process was initiated. It may also be a sign of attitudes being turned into behavior: normative and strategic policy statements in the early years perhaps turned into action—and were thus not merely cheap talk.

In sum, the data presented earlier suggests a change in national reconciliation initiatives over time in Rwanda: stressing attitudes initially, then making way for behavioral initiatives from 1998. Hence, one interpretation of the results is that national reconciliation initiatives were demonstrated more often in rhetoric (the two attitude categories) in the years closest to
the genocide when the situation for the government was more critical and the political threat higher. Subsequently, with more consolidation of the government, behavioral acts of reconciliation were taken more frequently. In Mozambique, where the peace accord held “remarkably well” (Ohlson, 1998) and peace and reconciliation came “remarkably quickly” (Hayner, 2001), very few initiatives for reconciliation were initiated from a governmental level. Here, community-level rituals for reconciliation and reintegration were widespread (Cobban, 2007; Nordstrom, 1997), a level not included in the scope of this study.

DISCUSSION

Considering the complexity of reconciliation, we must have a broad yet sharp array of methods for studying reconciliation processes at different levels. The method proposed in this article contributes to the study of reconciliation at the national level, focusing on the public behaviors of those in power. As stated earlier, the national level is central for reconciliation because initiatives here have direct consequences for the population, and it is at this level that the international community most often directs requests for reconciliation.

The suggested method should be seen as a building block in the search for a more comprehensive understanding of reconciliation and for the development of an empirically based theory of reconciliation. Combined with studies at the individual and social level, this method would enable comparison of post-conflict countries working with reconciliation as a peace-building and conflict-preventive measure, and enable researchers and practitioners to identify when reconciliation strategies help consolidate peace and if—and in that case when—there may be risks involved.

The method developed in this study demonstrated the expected differences in reconciliation initiatives in Rwanda and Mozambique and thus has considerable face validity. It revealed variations both over time and in type of reconciliation initiative. Built on Galtung’s (1969) conflict triangle, the suggested framework separating behavior and attitudes proved to be fruitful for structuring the analysis of national reconciliation initiatives. It is important to keep in mind that national reconciliation initiatives are statements and actions demonstrating reconciliation regardless of what is declared government policy. In this study, if the demonstrated attitude or behavior met the requirements of the definition for a national reconciliation initiative, it was coded as such—whether the intention was reconciliation or not. This is a strength of the study as intentions are very difficult to study at any level of analysis, and impossible to measure at this level. In addition, bypassing intentions increases interrater reliability. Further, it should be
stressed that no judgment was made of whether reconciliation initiatives were morally right or wrong or if they actually had positive effects.

Three hypotheses on reconciliation evolved during the course of applying the method. It remains to be seen to what extent the hypotheses may be generalized as they are based solely on two contrasting cases; however, they provide a starting point for further investigation and are, therefore, highlighted.

First, the methodological application confirmed the notion that national reconciliation initiatives have been much more frequent in Rwanda than in Mozambique. During the same time period (10 years from war termination), Rwanda has experienced more conflict than Mozambique. This illustrates the fruitfulness of separating reconciliation initiatives and actual reconciliation, not using the former as a proxy for the latter. Obvious as it may be, it is important to bear in mind that more reconciliation initiatives may be a sign of instability rather than a sign of peace. Consequently, the first hypothesis that evolves from this study is that more national reconciliation initiatives may indicate less reconciliation.

Second, in Rwanda, the reconciliation process has been initiated and led by the government and thus constitutes a formal national process. In Mozambique, very few national reconciliation initiatives were observed; rather, the reconciliation process has been informal and driven from a local level with very little governmental involvement (Nordstrom, 1997). The applied method confirmed this difference, leading to a second hypothesis regarding the character of reconciliation initiatives; namely, that informal and local reconciliation initiatives may be more effective for producing actual reconciliation than formal and national reconciliation initiatives.

Third, the question of how conflict termination (victory or compromise) affects the reconciliation process deserves further attention (Ross, 2004). May victory lead to more national reconciliation initiatives than a negotiated agreement? This study suggests this might be the case, Rwanda having six times the number of national reconciliation initiatives compared to Mozambique. In victory, reconciliation initiatives can be made without as much compromise as might be needed in a negotiated end to a conflict. Reconciliation initiatives after negotiation may be less frequent but perhaps more sensitive to all parties and thereby more successful in reaching their aim. Also, after a process of negotiation, people may be more ready for such initiatives. The third hypothesis, therefore, is that reconciliation initiatives being more sensitive to all parties are likely to be successful after a negotiated agreement than after victory. In other words, reconciliation initiatives may be more successful when having been designed to take all sides into account.

Finally, I want to mention one issue that emerged during the coding process concerning the importance of how genuine the reconciliation initiative should be to have a positive effect reconciliation initiatives may be
undertaken for many reasons (Daly & Sarkin 2007). Insincere reconciliation initiatives may perhaps be taken for example, in response to pressures from the international community to work for reconciliation in order to be granted certain assistance. Can such insincere initiatives be risky for peace? The sources do not take this into consideration and, therefore, neither can the coding system (Daly & Sarkin, 2007). Nevertheless, if there are risks involved, this would have important policy implications for the international community. More in-depth study would be needed to pursue such suspicious cases.

It would be valuable to apply the proposed method to a larger number of countries to develop and refine this methodological framework. It would also be interesting to study emotions in a similar way. Eventually, combined with studies at the individual and social level, comparisons may be made of national reconciliation initiatives between countries, both regarding quantity and quality, to see whether lessons can be learned regarding their subsequent effect on peace—or war.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Karen Brounéus recently received her Ph.D. in Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, Sweden. Her dissertation was entitled “Rethinking Reconciliation: Concepts, Methods, and an Empirical Study of Truth Telling and Psychological Health in Rwanda.” She is a clinical psychologist, and her research focuses on the psychological aspects of reconciliation processes after internal armed conflict.

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