Facultad de Economía

Fecha: 19/05/2022, 11:00

Modalidad: Virtual

Presentador: Paula Beltran

Autor: Paula Beltran

In this paper, I study the transmission of an aggregate funding supply shock in a lendingnetwork and quantitatively assess the implications for the allocative efficiency of funding pro-vision of the US Money Markets Funds Industry. I build a tractable model that features banksand funds that bargain over the terms of trade subject to an incomplete network of existingcounterparties and bilateral bargaining. I discipline the model using data on the funds’ port-folio. I show how to identify the key parameters of the model by exploiting granular shocks ofconnected agents. Taking as primitives the observed changes in assets under the managementof prime funds at the onset of the COVID-19 crisis, the model accounts for 85% of the drop intotal lending and 70% of the increase in price dispersion. I show that the allocation is inefficient.Faced with the same drop in asset under management and taking as given the network of bilat-eral counterparties, a central planner would reduce lending by 9% instead of 14% in equilibrium.Finally, I use the model to examine the effectiveness of the Overnight Repo Repurchase Facility.

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Fecha: 26/05/2022, 11:00

Modalidad: Virtual

Presentador: Juan Felipe Riaño

Autor: Juan Felipe Riaño

This paper provides the first systematic empirical examination of bureaucratic nepotism and anti-nepotism legislation in an entire modern bureaucracy. By linking confidential information on family ties and administrative employer-employee records for the universe of civil servants in Colombia, I uncover three sets of empirical findings. First, using a novel methodology of family network reconstruction, I provide evidence of the pervasiveness of close family connections in the public administration and demonstrate its negative relationship with the performance of public sector agencies. Second, by further exploiting within-bureaucrat variation in family connections generated by the turnover of top non-elected bureaucrats, I show that family connections to public sector managers and advisors distort the allocation and compensation of workers at lower levels of the hierarchy. Connected bureaucrats receive higher salaries and are more likely to be hierarchically promoted but are negatively selected in terms of public sector experience, education, and records of misconduct. Third, I evaluate an anti-nepotism legislation reform by exploiting a sharp discontinuity in the set of family connections restricted by this law. I prove the limited effectiveness of this reform and show how bureaucrats strategically responded to this policy change by substituting margins of favoritism and reshuffling posts within the public administration. Acerca del presentador: Juan Felipe Riaño is an Applied Microeconomist with research interests spanning the fields of Political Economy, Development Economics, and Economic History. He holds a Bachelor's and Masters' degree in Economics from Universidad de los Andes, and is currently a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at the University of British Columbia (UBC) in Canada. His current research agenda focuses on understanding the determinants of state capacity in developing countries and the long-term impact of conflict and historical institutions on economic development. More recently, he has been interested in the Organizational Economics of public sector institutions and the role of Cybersecurity in modern states.

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Fecha: 09/06/2022, 14:00

Modalidad: Presencial Auditorio 3 - Pedro Fermín

Presentador: Danila Serra

Autor: Danila Serra

We investigate whether ethics and integrity training can improve values, attitudes and behavior of police officers. We conducted a field experiment in Ghana, where we randomly selected traffic police officers to participate in a training program informed by theoretical work on the role of identity and motivation in organizations. The training was designed to re-activate intrinsic motivations to serve the public, and to create a new shared identity of ``Agent of Change," aimed at inducing a collective shift in attitudes and behaviors. Data generated by a survey and an incentivized cheating game conducted 20 months later, show that the program positively affected officers' values and beliefs regarding on-the-job unethical behavior and improved their attitudes toward citizens. Moreover, the program significantly lowered officers' propensity to behave unethically, as measured by their willingness to cheat in the incentivized game.

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